Live AOP: Carlos Eduardo Oliva: Laicidade e constitucionalidade inconstitucional do ensino religioso

No dia 30 de março de 2023 realizamos uma Live AOP com o professor, sociólogo e jurista Carlos Eduardo Oliva (UERJ-Colégio Pedro II), sobre a laicidade do Estado e a constitucionalidade inconstitucional do ensino religioso no Brasil.

Foi uma palestra muito interessante e muito agradável, que durou cerca de duas horas. O evento foi transmitido no canal Positivismo; foi também gravado e o vídeo está disponível aqui: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eLHq89UdwJw.

 

Anotações sobre a laicidade

No dia 17 de Aristóteles de 169 (14 de março de 2023) fizemos nossa prédica positiva. Em um primeiro momento, demos continuidade à leitura comentada do Catecismo positivista, em sua sexta conferência, dedicada ao conjunto do dogma; em particular, abordamos a lei estática do entendimento.

Em seguida, na parte do sermão positivo, apresentamos algumas reflexões sobre a laicidade do Estado: as anotações que serviram de base para essa exposição estão reproduzidas abaixo.

A prédica foi transmitida nos canais Apostolado Positivista (aqui: acesse.one/Laicidade1) e Positivismo (aqui: encr.pw/Laicidade2). O sermão sobre a laicidade pode ser visto a partir de 41' 50".

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Anotações sobre a “laicidade do Estado”

 

-        Um dos temas mais importantes de qualquer organização política moderna é a chamada “laicidade do Estado”

o   Vale notar que, apesar de sua importância literalmente fundamental, ela é rotineira e generalizadamente negligenciada, seja pela teoria política, seja pelos políticos práticos

o   Essa negligência não me parece casual, pois a laicidade impõe uma auto-restrição que quase ninguém está disposto a assumir (na teoria e/ou na prática)

-        O Positivismo desde o início bate-se pelo que se chama de “laicidade do Estado”

o   Para o Positivismo, o que se chama de “laicidade do Estado” é um dos princípios fundamentais de qualquer organização política – isso para não dizer que é o princípio fundamental

o   Entretanto, para o Positivismo, o que se chama vulgarmente de laicidade é entendido como uma aplicação específica do princípio da separação entre os dois poderes

-        Quais são, então, os dois poderes?

o   Poder Temporal: responsável pela manutenção da ordem material das sociedades; baseia-se na força física; modifica externamente (objetivamente) a conduta dos indivíduos

o   Poder Espiritual: responsável pela formação e manutenção das opiniões, das idéias e dos valores; baseia-se na confiança e no aconselhamento; modifica internamente (subjetivamente) a conduta dos indivíduos

-        Historicamente os dois poderes estiveram unidos, ainda que com a subordinação de um ao outro

o   Na Idade Média houve um primeiro esboço de separação entre os dois poderes, com a separação entre o Imperador e o Papa

§  Essa separação foi proposta, no âmbito da teologia católica, por São João Crisóstomo (séc. IV)

§  O episódio da “ida a Canossa” (Henrique IV vs. Gregório VII, em 1077) indica tanto a separação entre os dois poderes quanto a subordinação moral do poder Temporal

o   As fés absolutas aproximam-se das ordens indiscutíveis; assim, o absoluto filosófico está próximo do autoritarismo político (e/ou do militarismo)

§  Inversamente, a fé relativa aceita e promove a ativa reflexão filosófica, social e política

§  Vale notar que países que têm retrocedido para o autoritarismo são países que, não por acaso, têm negado a laicidade (seus valores e suas práticas)

o   Na modernidade os dois poderes devem manter-se separados; a separação entre os dois poderes baseia-se em uma série de considerações morais, intelectuais e políticas inter-relacionadas entre si:

§  O fundamento de cada um dos poderes é diferente: o poder Temporal baseia-se na força física (ou seja, na violência), enquanto o poder Espiritual baseia-se na confiança e no convencimento

§  Cada indivíduo deve escolher suas crenças com liberdade e autonomia e não ser constrangido oficialmente para isso

§  Uma crença que usa o poder Temporal para estabelecer-se torna-se degradada, reconhecendo implicitamente que não tem forças para difundir-se sozinha

§  Um Estado que impõe uma crença determinada ao mesmo tempo indica que carece de legitimidade e estimula a hipocrisia pública

§  Os atributos próprios a cada um dos poderes são diferentes: o orgulho para o poder Temporal, a vaidade para o poder Espiritual

§  As perspectivas de cada um dos poderes são diferentes:

·         O poder Temporal visa a mudar materialmente a sociedade, concentrando-se no presente (solidariedade), em operações parciais e sendo objeto de disputas francamente egoísticas;

·         O poder Espiritual visa a mudar afetiva e intelectualmente a sociedade, afirmando a continuidade humana ao longo da história, estimulando as visões de conjunto e buscando estimular o altruísmo e regular o egoísmo

§  Com base na separação dos dois poderes, o Positivismo garante a legitimidade do Estado, a dignidade espiritual e rejeita que problemas morais sejam solucionados pela via temporal (somente pela via espiritual, ou seja, pelo aconselhamento e pela educação)

-        De um ponto de vista político, a separação dos dois poderes resulta em que os indivíduos têm a mais completa liberdade para formarem e/ou mudarem as suas próprias opiniões

o   Evidentemente, como já indicamos, qualquer opinião baseia-se sempre na confiança depositada pelo crente em um órgão espiritual qualquer

o   De maneira concreta, a separação entre os dois poderes realiza-se na forma da “laicidade do Estado” e é completada por três liberdades fundamentais: (1) de consciência, (2) de expressão e (3) de associação

-        Do exposto acima, torna-se claro que a laicidade do Estado não é:

o   Não é o estabelecimento de Estado ateu

o   Não é o estabelecimento de Estado pluriconfessional

o   Não é anticlericalismo

-        Há alguns detalhes adicionais sobre as diversas fases da transição derradeira, para Augusto Comte, em particular a ausência de qualquer financiamento teórico (igrejas teológicas, universidades metafísicas e mesmo a igreja positiva)

-        Na teoria política mais recente (não por acaso especificamente francesa), a laicidade do Estado é afirmada em termos de cidadania:

o   A atual teoria política francesa da laicidade baseia-se na obra de Condorcet, que, antes de Augusto Comte, foi o maior teórico francês do tema

o   A laicidade assegura que, para a cidadania, requer-se apenas o respeito às leis do país

o   Inversamente, com a laicidade não se requer a adesão a nenhuma doutrina específica (e, conseqüentemente, nem a filiação a nenhuma organização específica)

o   No que se refere ao serviço público, isso gera uma ética específica: tudo aquilo que tem a participação do Estado, direta ou indireta, tem que se manter neutro em termos doutrinários

-        Há diferenças entre laicidade e tolerância:

o   Para o que nos interessa, a tolerância é a aceitação, mais ou menos ampla, da parte dos governantes em relação às crenças dos cidadãos que não comungam da doutrina oficial de Estado (a liberdade de crença é uma concessão do Estado e/ou do governante e, como concessão, pode ser mantida ou suprimida)

o   A laicidade é a afirmação da cidadania apenas no respeito às leis e não depende da boa vontade do Estado e/ou do governante (a liberdade de crença é o fundamento das liberdades públicas e da cidadania)

-        Laicidade de princípio e laicidade de compromisso:

o   Laicidade de princípio: é estabelecida considerando que ela é o fundamento das liberdades e da cidadania; ela fundamenta efetivamente uma organização social e política

o   Laicidade de compromisso: estabelece-se a laicidade porque nenhuma seita específica tem poder suficiente para impor-se sobre o conjunto da população; é claro que ela é instável

-        No Brasil a laicidade foi estabelecida plenamente apenas em 1890 e até 1931

o   Não por acaso, a laicidade na I República foi estabelecida graças à ativa e difundida propaganda do Positivismo

o   Antes de 1890 e após 1931 o país viveu momentos de religião oficial (colônia, império), religião semioficial e Estado para-pluriconfessional (após 1931, até hoje)

-        No Brasil atual a “discussão” sobre laicidade apresenta-se da seguinte forma:

o   A direita é claramente contra a laicidade ou é cinicamente alheia a ela

o   A esquerda oscila entre a rejeição e o alheamento (como a direita) ou – no caso da esquerda identitária – adota uma visão pobre e instrumentalista da laicidade para justificar o anticlericalismo tópico

o   Há serviços públicos realmente universais e ligados apenas à cidadania (SUS), mas há serviços públicos que exigem a adesão explícita a um determinado credo oficial (vestibulares de IFES)

o   A Constituição Federal de 1988 é extremamente contraditória:

§  Afirma a ausência de apoio, subvenção ou embaraço público às religiões (Art. 19, I)

§  Proclama a Constituição “em nome de deus” (Preâmbulo) e afirma a colaboração do Estado com igrejas em nome do interesse público (Art. 19, I)

o   Os doutrinadores jurídicos justificam essa aberração político-intelectual por meio das categorias (igualmente aberrantes) “Estado colaborador” ou “laicidade atenuada”

§  Vale notar que a laicidade não é uma questão de quantidade, mas de qualidade; ela seria uma categoria discreta (sim/não, presente/ausente) e não uma categoria contínua (mais/menos)

§  Assim, nenhuma dessas categorias jurídico-políticas a posteriori realmente faz sentido

Um ministro "terrivelmente evangélico" contra a República

O artigo abaixo critica inicialmente a indicação e, depois, a aprovação em sabatina de André Mendonça para ministro do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Como se sabe, essa indicação foi feita com base no predicado de que ele seria um ministro "terrivelmente evangélico", o que deveria ser encarado como um descalabro por todos aqueles que se preocupam com a República. 

Infelizmente, poucas foram as pessoas e as instituições que se manifestaram contra esse descalabro; a maioria dos "formadores de opinião" no Brasil permaneceu quieta (e, portanto, omissa) ou apoiou (e, portanto, é cúmplice) desse verdadeiro crime de lesa-república. O artigo explica, em poucas linhas, os inúmeros problemas teóricos e práticos causados por essa indicação clericalista.

Vale notar que todas as manifestações públicas de André Mendonça antes e, principalmente, depois da sabatina no Senado Federal confirmam os meus argumentos abaixo.

O texto foi publicado no jornal carioca Monitor Mercantil em 8 de dezembro de 2021 (disponível aqui, com acesso aberto) e no jornal curitibano Gazeta do Povo em 14 de dezembro de 2021 (disponível aqui, para assinantes).

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Um ministro "terrivelmente evangélico" contra a República

No dia 1° de dezembro de 2021, André Mendonça, ex-ministro da Justiça do Governo Bolsonaro, foi sabatinado pelo Senado Federal para a vaga de ministro do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF). A sabatina, que terminou por aprovar a indicação, e a própria indicação constituem episódios lamentáveis na vida política brasileira, no sentido de que são atentatórios contra o conjunto da República e, em particular, contra a laicidade do Estado. Sem nos deter em detalhes, vejamos os problemas.

Antes de mais nada, temos que dizer com todas as letras: a indicação pelo presidente da República e a aprovação pelo Senado Federal – mesmo que quase cinco meses depois da indicação – de alguém que foi indicado apenas por ser “terrivelmente evangélico” é um retrocesso político e social no Brasil.

O problema não está exatamente nas crenças íntimas de André Mendonça, mas no motivo da indicação e também no fato de que o próprio indicado jamais renegou esse motivo. Se o Estado é laico – e se ele deve ser e deve manter-se laico – a condição religiosa dos ministros é completamente irrelevante: o que importa é se o indicado valoriza as instituições republicanas e seus valores fundantes (liberdades públicas, inclusão social, fraternidade e paz universais etc.). Se o indicado respeitar e, mais do que isso, se ele valorizar de fato as instituições e os valores republicanos, não importa se ele é católico, ateu, budista, presbiteriano, umbandista, cardecista, positivista, luterano, satanista ou evangélico.

Antes de seguirmos adiante, uma pequena digressão. Ao contrário do que prega a mistificação parlamentarista, o parlamento não é uma instituição de “debates” e serve mal para a defesa das garantias e das liberdades públicas. Se o Congresso Nacional, representado pelo Senado, quisesse de fato garantir as instituições republicanas, deveria ter dado uma resposta institucional e reprovado a cínica indicação clericalista do ministro “terrivelmente evangélico”; essa recusa teria um peso e um impacto muito maiores que a mera decisão individual de David Alcolumbre de postergar por cinco meses a sabatina de André Mendonça.

Aliás, o concomitante desprezo do conjunto do Congresso Nacional pela ordem do próprio STF para tornar público o “orçamento secreto” – que é o instrumento atual da corrupção política em favor dos parlamentares – deveria bastar para pôr abaixo todas as pretensões parlamentaristas, apesar da retórica diversionista que trata do “presidencialismo de coalizão”.

Enfim, a futura nomeação do ministro do STF “terrivelmente evangélico” coroa paradoxalmente uma política seguida desde sempre pela... Igreja Católica. Essa instituição combateu a laicização do Estado em 1889-1891, voltou orgulhosa ao poder em 1931 e, sempre que pode, reafirma suas pretensões a religião oficial do país, bem como um sem-número de privilégios políticos, fiscais, pedagógicos (como no caso da Concordata de 2008, assinada por Lula).

Em face disso, os evangélicos sempre foram ambíguos: defendem a laicidade apenas para opor-se aos católicos, mas, quando percebem que podem ganhar, aliam-se despudoradamente aos inimigos da véspera (novamente, a Concordata de 2008 é exemplar). Não se trata, portanto, de respeito doutrinário à laicidade do Estado ou às instituições republicanas: é a mais rasteira conveniência política.

A aprovação do ministro “terrivelmente evangélico” – indicado pelo “católico” Jair Bolsonaro – é também a vitória da política identitária. O identitarismo opõe-se violentamente aos universalismos republicanos, ao defender uma política de representação das identidades, em termos de proporcionalidade demográfica.

Em outras palavras, o identitarismo rejeita a concepção de que a República é composta por cidadãos e que se constitui de regras universais; ao mesmo tempo, o identitarismo defende a concepção de que a política serve para representar os particularismos e que a República é apenas a justaposição desses grupos particularismos, que teriam direito a nacos do Estado com base nas proporções demográficas da população brasileira – idealmente, por meio de… cotas. Sem tirar nem pôr, foram exatamente essas as justificativas de Bolsonaro ao fazer a indicação do ministro “terrivelmente evangélico”.

Mas também é importante realçar que a política identitária é indiferente ou até hostil à laicidade do Estado, defendendo-a apenas se e quando lhe convém, sem maior engajamento filosófico e político. E mais do que isso: embora o identitarismo seja atualmente instrumento da esquerda, dos chamados “progressistas”, o fato é que a política identitária é uma invenção da direita, na Alemanha das décadas de 1920 e 1930, cuja expressão máxima coube a um cabo e pintor de rua que obteve o poder. Enfim, os efeitos nefastos do identitarismo deveriam agora, mais do que nunca, estar claros para todos, na medida em que o identitarismo foi aplicado à perfeição no Brasil.

Indicado contra a laicidade e a República, a partir de uma concepção identitária, André Mendonça já deixou claro que não entende o que é a laicidade – e, portanto, o que é a República. Para ele, respeitar o Estado laico significa limitar-se a não fazer orações no plenário ou no ambiente do STF... isso é mais ou menos o mesmo que dizer que um servidor público deve respeitar o Código de Ética e que isso significa não andar pelado nas repartições públicas.

A laicidade é não conceder privilégios para as doutrinas e suas igrejas; é não restringir a cidadania aos adeptos de uma determinada instituição; é não ser indicado para a vaga de ministro do STF por ser pastor de uma igreja; é não deturpar a belíssima frase de Neil Armstrong para comemorar o particularismo identitário da sua aprovação como futuro integrante do STF.

Para concluir, é importante lembrar: o Positivismo (como filosofia social e política) e os positivistas (como cidadãos brasileiros) são uns dos poucos, se não forem simplesmente os únicos, que defendem a laicidade do Estado e o universalismo da República, como elementos da Ordem e do Progresso do Brasil e da Humanidade.

Desde o início de suas atividades no Brasil, na década de 1870, os positivistas sempre deixaram claro que laicidade e republicanismo andam juntos, apoiam-se e reforçam-se; combater um é combater o outro, necessariamente. Assim, é como positivista e, portanto, como cidadão brasileiro que observo: o presidente da República que, com base em uma concepção de identitarismo clericalista, indicou um “ministro terrivelmente evangélico”; o Congresso Nacional, que atuou como cúmplice na sabatina desse indicado; o próprio pastor terrivelmente evangélico – todos atuam contra a laicidade e contra a República; contra a ordem e o progresso.

  

Gustavo Biscaia de Lacerda é sociólogo da UFPR e doutor em Sociologia Política.

Estado laico acima de tudo, Humanidade acima de todos

Após a aprovação (em 1.12.2021, na sabatina no Senado Federal) como novo ministro do Supremo Tribunal Federal de André Mendonça, cujo critério de seleção pelo Presidente da República consistiu em ser "terrivelmente evangélico", é necessário reafirmarmos o princípio abaixo.

Fonte e autoria: desconhecidas.

Artigo "Laicism in Brazil"

Em nossa postagem "Verbetes na 'Encyclopedia of Latin American Religions': Positivismo e laicidade", de 5.8.2019, divulgamos que tivemos dois artigos (ou melhor, verbetes) na Enclyclopedia of Latin American Religions, publicada pela editora Springer.

Pois bem: seguindo os parâmetros editoriais da Springer, podemos tornar público o artigo em sua versão preliminar, isto é, sem a formatação da editora e sem a paginação.

Assim, o texto inicial está disponível abaixo.

As referências bibliográficas para consulta efetiva são estas:

Biscaia de Lacerda G. (2019) Laicity in Brazil. In: Gooren H. (eds) Encyclopedia of Latin American Religions. Religions of the World. pp 821-825, Springer, Cham, pp 821-825

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Laicism in Brazil

Gustavo Biscaia de Lacerda

Setor de Ciências Exatas, Universidade Federal do Paraná

Curitiba

Brazil

Keywords

Laicism, Catholic Church, Brazilian State, juridical-political organization.

Definition

Laicism can be understood as the theory that advocates the separation between church and State (“laicity”), as well as the militant practice that follows from the theory. It is not the defense of an atheist State, as it does not deny God nor forbids religions; on the other hand, it is not pluriconfessionalism, because laicity respect but not “recognize” religions nor bring them inside the State or finance them: so, laicity is more a position of indifference or neutrality between church and State. During Brazilian history, the State had official religion (Catholicism in particular) and a formally perfect laicity of State; in other moments, Catholicism has been a para-official religion; Brazil has never had atheism of State or pluriconfessionalism. Currently, a strong social and political activism fights pro and against laicity.

Introduction

Since January 7, 1890, Brazil is characterized by laicity, just after the proclamation of Republic (November 15, 1889)[1]. In terms of history of religions in Brazil, or, more precisely, the history of religious liberties, these two dates establishes a “before” and a “later” and, then, are central to deal with laicity in Brazil in general. Such a subject must be treated in sociological terms; as society doesn’t exist in the vacuum, we must consider the relations maintained by at least four collective-institutional actors: the State; the Catholic Church; non-catholic religions; and civil society in general. At the same time, a historical approach is necessary, in order to understand the many transformations those relations have suffered during time and that conforms the Brazilian religious milieu today. On the other hand, some legal remarks will be done, as the formal relations between the State and the churches/religions are defined by law, specially in the many national constitutions. Considering all these aspects (historical-sociological and legal), much of the discussion on laicism in Brazil deals in particular with the relations between Catholic Church (or ICAR – Igreja Católica Apostólica Romana) and the Brazilian State, be it historically or politically.

Anyway, as we said above, we can establish two main phases on laicity in Brazil, before and after the proclamation of Brazilian Republic (November 15, 1889) and the subsequent Decree n. 119-A (January 7, 1890): before, Catholicism was the official religion, sustained by the State and with a number of privileges and duties (even its situation was many times a difficult one, with disputes with the government); after 1889-1890, it was proclaimed the freedom of consciousness, expression and association in a general canvas of laicity, but for a long time many cults – mainly those that are nowadays called “of African matrix” (such as Candomblé and Umbanda), but also Allan Kardec’s Spiritism – have been persecuted and in some periods Catholicism appeared as a para-official religion (like in 1930-1946 and 1964-1966).

Basic definitions: secularism, laicity, laicism

We need some basic, operational definitions. So, we can define laicism as the mutual absence of support by the State and the many churches, in the sense that the State does not privilege any church and, in the contrary, it also does not create obstacles to the existence of any church; it can also be understood in the sense that the State does not have an official doctrine that must be accepted by all citizens in order to have a full citizenship. By the part of the churches, laicity imply they do not ask for the State to use its power to impose to society their particular beliefs (even if some church assemble the majority of the population of some country).

Separation between churches and the State can happen in a number of different situations (although not in any social context); for example, during the Middle Ages, the Papacy and the Holy Empire were two distinct institutions which divided and disputed the mastery over Catholic Europe. However, as the Catholic Church intended not only to be a spiritual power, but a temporal one too, both Papacy and the Holy Empire clashed, as the “Road to Canossa” episode, in the XI Century, exemplifies; the result of those clashes were the mutual neutralization and the overture of the path for the ascension of the kings as rulers of Europe.

The “Road to Canossa” also exemplifies a separation of church and State in a situation of a non-secularized society: however, we must recognize that in such societies separation between church and State are the exception, not the rule. On the other hand, seculariz(ed) societies are the most common and easy milieus for the institutionalization of laicity, as there happens the progressive privatization of believes, the separation of realms (political, religious etc.) and the rationalization of life (Casanova 1994), specially the first two features.

So, for our purposes, laicity presupposes the broad process of secularization. It is important to note that, as “laicity” is the phenomenon, “laicism” can be understood both as the process and the militancy for the laicity. For us, laicism in the sense of militancy is just a descriptive noun, which we use without value judgments; however, in Brazil, many social-political actors use that word with a negative sense, implying it as an aggressive militancy which supposedly seeks for the laicization not only of the State, but also of the society itself: in particular, that is the interpretation of Brazilian branch of Catholic Church.

From colony to I Republic (1500-1930)

As we have said before, the history of laicism in Brazil is divided into two main phases, before and after the proclamation of Republic, in 1889; the period before 1889, by its part, is divided into two other phases, the colonial Brazil (1500-1822) and the Brazilian Empire (1822-1889). Leaving aside the particular characteristics of the colonial phase, for what concerns to the relations between church and State, as Brazil was a Portuguese colony, its institutions followed Portuguese ones; so, the official religion – and, as a matter of fact, the only accepted religion – was that established by ICAR.

Two specific institutions were particularly religiously important to the Portuguese State, concerning the whole building of the Catholic Church: the regalism (“regalismo”) and the patronage (“padroado”). They both were conceded in early Modern times by the Holy See to the Iberian monarchies (Portugal and Spain). By the patronage, the monarch was the responsible both for the defense and propagation of the Catholic doctrine and for the maintenance of the Catholic church; by the regalism, the Temporal power not only pay for the whole structure of the church, but was also responsible for organizing its bureaucratic structure, including the appointment of the bishops, priests etc.: so, actually, the clerics were public officials and depended of and were limited by the State. Anyway, it is important to notice that the Church was an important instrument of the colonization of the territory (Weffort 2012), as it can be seen by the examples of Jesuitical priests Manoel da Nóbrega and Antônio Vieira.

After 1822, when Brazil became an independent State, the monarchic regime was maintained (in order to keep together all the provinces) and so did the ecclesiastic structure; in particular, both patronage and regalism remained. But the Brazilian Empire differed from the Brazilian colony, among other aspects, by having a constitution and, according to it, despite the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion was the official doctrine of the State (art. 5^th of the Constitution of 1824), other confessions were accepted, since they were not publicly professed and their temples have not an exterior aspect of churches: non-catholic religions (or, more specifically, non-catholic christianisms) were literally private matters[2].

During the Brazilian Empire, the situation of Catholic Church was paradoxical: on the one hand, it had a lot of privileges, like the exclusivity of civil acts (registration of births, deaths, matrimonies), the management of public cemeteries and maintenance of basic public schools and basic public teaching; on the other hand, without rejecting the political importance of ICAR for public control, the State and many Statesmen acted in order to restrict the action of the Church, by imposing rigorous limits to the number of new priests graduated in Brazil, of the importation of new priests from abroad, the maintenance of churches and parishes in the interior of the country etc. Such a policy was followed even by men like Priest Feijó, during his regency (1835-1837), or the Emperor d. Pedro II himself (1840-1889) (Scampini 1978) (albeit the Emperor acted cautiously in this case, just like in everything else). The climate of confrontation between Church and State grew over the years and in 1872-1875 the “Religious Question” (“Questão Religiosa”) opposed neatly both institutions, with some ultramontanists bishops on one side and free-masons, Enlightenment-like civil servants on the other side.

The Republican movement – which has rebirth in 1870 – was not unitary, but many propagandists of Republic also favored the separation between church and State: liberals, positivists, even freemasons. The Republic being proclaimed in November 15, 1889, only two months later (January 7, 1890) the separation between Church and State has been accomplished, through the Decree n. 119-A, which separated citizenship and the religious professions: the State ceased both to finance and control Church(es) and, on the other hand, Catholic Church ceased to regulate civil acts (like birth, death and matrimony registrations); however, the mortmain (“mão morta”)[3] has been maintained at first, due to the influence of Rui Barbosa. Anyway, in February 24, 1891, a new, Republican Constitution has been approved by the National Congress, reaffirming the laicization of Brazilian State and securing the liberties of consciousness, expression and association; official holidays lost their religious character and assumed civic human traits[4]. As the Positivist leader Raimundo Teixeira Mendes noticed, laicization of the State was so desired by the people and the civil and military elites that there were virtually no complaints and no riots at all against it (Lacerda 2016).

Despite these legal provisions, the laicization process was not fully accomplished: administration of public cemeteries were not ran by the State (Lacerda 2016) and much of the educational system remained under the control of Catholic Church (Cunha 2007). Just after the Decree n. 119-A, the Church itself complained vehemently against what it saw as a “violence”, demanding in particular the maintenance of its character of official doctrine and some sort of patronage (but without regalism).

However, soon the clergy perceived that the laicization of the State was not bad at all and, on the contrary, it freed the Church and created the conditions for its reorganization, reversing the harsh institutional conditions suffered during the Empire. The quest for patronage-without-regalism remained constant through the Republican years; in 1916, the future Bishop of Rio de Janeiro and Brazilian Cardinal d. Sebastião Leme launched the campaign named “Neo-Christendom” (“Neocristandade”), aiming to “recatholicize” both Brazilian State and society. In 1925-1926, in a process of constitutional revision, Sebastião Leme tried to inscribe in the Brazilian Constitution some article instituting again Catholicism as official creed, affirming it the “religion of the Brazilian people”; however, President Arthur Bernardes refused such a proposition: the Revolution of 1930, which ended the Brazilian I Republic, changed the situation and allowed the Neocristandade project to be finally victorious.

From the Vargas Era to the military regime (1930-1964)

In the end of 1930 Getúlio Vargas leaded a successful civilian-military coup, putting an end to the social-political arrangement of the I Republic and beginning a 15-year period called by the historians the “Vargas Era” – which was divided into many different phases: provisional (1930-1934) and constitutional (1934-1937) governments and civilian-military dictatorship (1937-1945). While the period 1889-1930 was characterized by the prevalence of rural societies and the rule of regional elites in a strong federalism, after 1930 Vargas conducted Brazil into a united (even authoritarian) government and to efforts of State-oriented industrialization.

After the revolutionary movement of 1930, Vargas needed political support to make stable his new regime; such a need was soon perceived by Sebastião Leme, who in 1931 – by the way, during the inauguration of the now world-famous monument “Christ the Redeemer” (“Cristo Redentor”) – proposed a not fair trade to Vargas: ICAR would support the new regime in exchange of many concessions and privileges granted by the State and based on the myth of Brazil as a “Christian nation” (Della Cava 1975); so, Catholicism assumed a condition of para-official religion of Brazil, with the obligatory presence of the clergy in official ceremonies, the Church ruling the public education, the introduction of a facultative discipline of “Religious Education” in the regular periods of classes and the possibility of “collaboration” between church and State based on the “public interest”. Besides that, a major social-political Catholic activism was developed, with the creation of the Electoral Catholic League (“Liga Eleitoral Católica”), the Catholic workers circles and the aggressive criticisms made by intellectual lays (like Jackson de Figueiredo) against liberalism, freedom of consciousness and, more generally, against modernity; alongside with the efforts of recatholicization of the State and the elites, the Neo-Christendom tented to support more conservatives and authoritarian conceptions of the society and the State. In 1937, when Vargas accomplished a new civilian-military coup, now to establish an authoritarian, fascist-like regime (called “New State” (“Estado Novo”)), ICAR made no opposition to that[5]. Besides that, the Afro-Brazilian cults were criminalized and the many Protestantisms suffered intolerance. Finally, the homage to “God” was inscribed in the constitution of 1934 – albeit, curiously, it was absent in the authoritarian constitution of 1937.

During the authoritarian “New State”, laicity had a difficult situation. Firstly, ICAR acted actively before to be a para-official church; secondly, Vargas created polices for political activities and ideological diffusion, besides an office for official propaganda: albeit the New State was not a totalitarian regime, it had something like an official ideology, imposed over society and characterized by a cult of the dictator, strong nationalism and an emphasis on hierarchy and military-like order. From 1930 until 1937, despite the more or less liberal environment, many illiberal ideologies championed in Brazil, including Communism and “Integralism” (“Integralismo”), the Brazilian version of Fascism, besides the more conservative, authoritarian version of Catholicism, that is, the Neo-Christendom. After 1937 and until 1945, only remained Neo-Christendom and the official propaganda: cults and religions other than Catholicism were accepted (when they were accepted) only as they were practiced as more or less private matters and, above all, as non-political ones. Yet, it is noteworthy that in the 1930’s and the 1940’s a political-pedagogical movement called “New School” (“Escola Nova”), leaded by Anísio Teixeira, championed the causes of democracy, modern pedagogical methods and laicity in Education (Cunha 2007).

During World War II, Brazil had been aligned with USA; the defeat of the nazi-fascist regimes in Europe led to a growing pression to democratization, what occurred through a military coup in the end of 1945; in 1946 a new, democratic constitution was promulgated, changing some of the terms of the relation between ICAR and the State, but not reversing to the status quo of full laicity previous to 1930. The laicity of the State and the religious freedom were affirmed, but the collaboration between church and State in the name of public interest remained, as well as classes of Religious Education in the regular times; on the other hand, chaplaincies were allowed to exist in the Armed Forces.

Anyway, after 1946 two major social traits were the social-intellectual pluralization and politization; it was the period of the decolonization nationalism, but also of the Cold War and Brazil was not exempt from its troubles. Political-intellectual Marxism spread through society and constituted by itself a major force on behalf of secularization and laicity (even sometimes also on behalf of atheism); it influenced ICAR, which divided into two great tendencies, one more “progressist” and Marxism-friendly and another more conservative: in broad terms, a left-wing and a right-wing ICAR. Both were militant, but the leftist Catholics had more prominence, providing support for social movements of students, urban and rural workers, women etc. Political Catholicism has suffered ambiguous influences in that period, anyway: Marxism, nationalism and pluralization all worked in the direction of secularization; II Vatican Council (1962-1965), affirming the need and the correction of openness of ICAR to the modernity, refrained the (declining) importance of ultramontanist impulses of Catholic Church in Brazil and, in certain way, legitimized the secularization process; but, at the same time, in 1952 it was founded the National Conference of Bishops of Brazil (Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil – CNBB), assembling all the Brazilian bishops in an unique institution[6], but mainly giving voice to the leftist priests and, so, legitimizing their political action and their support to social movements.

On the other hand, Protestantisms also spread, specially in the lower classes; not as militant as Catholics (or not militant at all), they were more conservatives or openly politically rightist, claiming against (atheist) Communism (even based on the Catholic myth of Brazil as a “Christian nation”).

From 1946 on, but specially after 1961, radicalization accompanied politization. The years between 1961 and 1964 have seen many disturbances related to the Presidential succession from the rightist President Jânio Quadros (who renounced in 1961, just after seven months in office) to the leftist vice-President João Goulart (whose alias was “Jango”). In order to be installed in office, Jango first accepted to lose Presidential powers, after a maneuver to establish parliamentarism in Brazil, in 1962; after a harsh campaign for the re-establishment of presidentialism, Jango regained full power, but his fame as a radical leftist (albeit he wasn’t initially radical), the aggressive campaigns of the rightist opposition and the climate of Cold War weakened the social-political support to Jango; the result was the growing radicalization of the President of Brazil, which resulted in April 1, 1964, in a civilian-military coup, which soon installed a mostly military authoritarian regime, lasting until 1985.

Just like Vargas’ “New State”, during the military regime most religions were tolerated if they were practiced as non-political matters. But unlike the authoritarian regime of 1937-1945, the military regime had no official ideology other than the militant anti-Communism and, in certain periods, some political and/or economical nationalism. In 1964 ICAR supported the civilian-military coup in the name of anti-Communism, but, due the political persecutions and, after, the practice of tortures, ICAR soon distanced itself from the regime, becoming then a focus of opposition to the regime. On the other hand, looking for some religious legitimation, the regime changed a century-long policy and invited some Protestants – mostly Evangelicals – to participate of official ceremonies. Protestants and, in particular, Evangelicals were both vigorous anti-Communists and non-political actors, so they were very adequate to substitute ICAR as para-official priests. Those changes – even if they were merely temporary concerning ICAR –, in addition to the support of Catholic Church to the transition from authoritarianism to democracy in the early 1980’s set apart the institution from the State, at least during some time (Della Cava, 1975; Mariano, 2002).

From the New Republic on (1985-…)

In 1985 a new, civilian President has been elected in Brazil (Tancredo Neves, who died before assuming office and being succeeded by the vice-President, José Sarney). That event was a mark in the Brazilian political transition, which began in late 1970’s with a controlled overture, passed through provincial elections for gubernators (in 1982, with a massive victory of opposition) and an indirect election for President (in 1985) and culminated in 1988 with the promulgation of a new Constitution – the “citizen constitution”. All that process occurred with the strong participation of the civil society: old and new neighbor associations, professional unions, cultural and thematic organizations (landless workers, houseless people, environmentalism, feminists, gays etc.) and, for sure, churches developed an intense activism during that period and, in particular, contributed during the debates of the new constitution.

Such an activism was (and is) based on basic civil freedoms: consciousness, expression and association; as those social movements affirmed themselves at the expense of the State, they also affirmed values and practices close to laicity, even if they didn’t intended to. However, we must observe that, as ICAR distanced itself from the State during the military regime, its action developed in civil society and much of the activism of the late 1970’s and 1980’s was influenced or even organized and sustained by the Catholic Church: so, laicity as an absence of mutual influences between church and State suffered or, at least, was in an ambiguous situation, as the “confessionalization” of politics was again affirmed, this time by the side of civil society. On the other hand, after the invitation of the military presidents for the political engagement of Evangelicals, these churches began to launch candidates, appealing directly to ecclesiastical values: “believer votes in believer” was their motto during the 1980’s and most of the 1990’s[7]. A sign of the renewed confessionalization of the politics is the inscription of the motto “God be blessed” (“Deus seja louvado”) in all currency notes since 1986 by the pious President Sarney.

The Constitution of 1988 followed the ambivalent pattern of previous constitutions concerning laicity: on one hand, it affirmed the separation of churches and State in terms according to the concept of laicity (art. 19); but, on the other hand, it accepted the “collaboration” between churches and the State in the case of “public interest”, affirmed the teaching of Religious Education[8] and, in its “Preamble”, affirmed that the Constitution was promulgated under the “protection of God”[9] (Brasil s/d-b). These provisions had their effects: in 1996 a new Law of Basis of Education was promulgated, where Religious Education is reaffirmed as constitutive of the scholar curriculum, although as an optional discipline to be offered in regular school period (Brasil s/d-c); in 1997 an amendment to that law affirmed that the teachers of Religious Education must be paid by the State, but leaving open the specific subject matter of such discipline[10].

Besides that, in 2008 President Lula signed an agreement with the Holy See, by the occasion of the visit of Pope Benedict XVI – a Concordat, reaffirming old privileges of ICAR and establishing new ones, such as the legal provision of Catholic chaplaincies in the military and in public hospitals and the express reference to Catholicism in the Religious Education curricula (Cunha 2009). To be approved by the Brazilian National Congress, the government proposed the creation of a “General Law of Religions” (“Lei Geral das Religiões”), extending the privileges of ICAR present in the Concordat to “all” religions, but targeting in particular Evangelicals. Such “General Law of Religions” have not been approved until 2018, but the international treaty that is the Concordat continues producing internal effects.

The Concordat was a major theme that opposed ICAR to Evangelicals, but in practice these organizations are frequently allied in moral issues, both in society and in Brazilian parliaments: fight against pro-abortion and pro-same sex marriage laws are two conspicuous examples of such close political alliances.

The growing pluralization of Brazilian civil society, specially from the 1980’s on, has its effects on the religiosity of people: on one hand, in the last three decades the number of atheists, agnostics and persons without religion (and/or even without church affiliation) has grown[11], with the creation of militant associations of atheists, agnostics and secular humanists; on the other hand, despite the maintenance of the privileges of ICAR, its numbers has fallen (95% in 1940 to 64,6% in 2010), in part due to the growing number of Evangelicals (2,7% in 1940 to 22,2% in 2010) (Alves 2017). Finally, the Afro-Brazilian cults are more evident and demanding of respect and tolerance, as well as Spiritism.

Considering those demographic changes, the more important feature of Brazilian politics concerning religion is the organization of Evangelicals in political parties and their eagerness to master public offices and to influence policies; albeit not indifferent to political-economic themes, their agenda is primarily moral, aggressively demanding legislation tending to more conservative behavior patterns. On the other hand, with more or less success they repeatedly try to impose the lecture of the Bible and/or to celebrate cults in public spaces, like schools and even parliaments.

One of the major alterations in the Brazilian polity made by the Constitution of 1988 is the more independence and power granted to Attorney General Office (“Ministério Público”), seen since then as the “guardian of citizenship”. So, specially since mid-2000’s, Federal Attorney General Office and its subnational branches develop an active defense of laicity, both through judicial processes and educational campaigns[12]. Anyway, a great social-political-juridical activism pro-laicity is being done by Ministério Público and civil society, motivated by the separation between churches and State, but also for sensitive issues, like education, abortion, same-sex marriage etc.

As a last remark, we must notice that, despite the clear concept of laicity as the mutual indifference between churches and the State, remains in Brazil two major confusions, either they are innocent or interested, between laicity and atheism of State, on one hand, and between laicity and pluriconfessionalism. They represent conceptual differences, but also different political arrangements concerning State and religions. Atheism deny God and an atheist State in practice is anti-clericalist; so, by imposing an official doctrine the atheist State distances itself from the laicity – but, in order to fight laicity, it is an easy rethoric resource to force the confusion between it and atheism of State. On the other hand, pluriconfessionality seems to many either an alternative to laicity or even its best realization: by recognizing and bringing religions inside the State, many consider the pluriconfessionalism a more “democratic” way to deal with politics and religion. Brazil has not an atheist State; despite many prefer pluriconfessionality in good faith, many defends it as a means to deny and cease laicity.

Cross References

Catholicism in Brazil; Vargas, Getúlio; Positivism in Brazil; Roman Catholic Apostolic Church; Protestantism in Brazil; Secularism

References

ALVES JED (2017) A transição religiosa na América Latina e no Brasil. Available at https://www.ecodebate.com.br/2017/05/31/transicao-religiosa-na-america-latina-e-no-brasil-artigo-de-jose-eustaquio-diniz-alves/. Access in Jan 19, 2018.

BRASIL (s/d-a) Constituições anteriores. Available at http://www4.planalto.gov.br/legislacao/legislacao-historica/constituicoes-anteriores-1. Access in Jan 19, 2018.

BRASIL (s/d-b) Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988. Available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Constituicao/Constituicao.htm. Access in Jan 19, 2018.

BRASIL (s/d-c) Lei n. 9394. Available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L9394.htm. Access in Jan 19, 2018.

CASANOVA J (1994) Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago.

CNMP (2014) Ministério Público em defesa do Estado laico. Brasília, Conselho Nacional do Ministério Público.

CUNHA LA (2007) Sintonia oscilante. Cadernos de Pesquisa, 131: 285-302.

CUNHA LA (2009) A educação na Concordata Brasil-Vaticano. Educação e Sociedade, 106: 263-280.

DELLA CAVA R (1975) Igreja e Estado no Brasil do século XX. Estudos Cebrap, 12: 5-52.

KERTZER, DI (2017) O Papa e Mussolini. Rio de Janeiro, Intrínseca.

LACERDA GB (2016) Laicidade na I República brasileira. Curitiba, Appris.

LINHARES MYL (ed.) (2016) História geral do Brasil. 10 ed. Rio de Janeiro, Elsevier.

MARIANO R (2002) Secularização do Estado, liberdades e pluralismo religioso. Available at http://www.naya.org.ar/congreso2002/ponencias/ricardo_mariano.htm. Access in Jan 19, 2018.

SCAMPINI J (1978) A liberdade religiosa nas constituições brasileiras. Petrópolis, Vozes.

WEFFORT FC (2012) Espada, cobiça e fé. Rio de Janeiro, Civilização Brasileira.

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[1] A general picture of Brazilian history can be read in Linhares (2016).

[2] Mariano (2002) has noticed that that openness for other religions beyond Catholicism was due to the policy of immigration of the Brazilian Empire, which preferred German and Swiss workers, most of them being Protestants; they created colonies in the Southern and South-Eastern provinces of Brazil.

[3] The mortmain was as institution of medieval origin according to which ecclesiastical properties – specially real estate ones – needed the approval of the Temporal power to be alienated; so, in the Brazilian context, it was part of regalism.

[4] A strong symbol of that laicization was the absence of any reference to “God” in the Constitution of 1891, just like that of 1937 – but differently from all the other Republican ones (1934, 1946, 1967, 1988) (cf. Brasil s/d-a, s/d-b).

[5] Such support was not only close to the ultramontanist inspiration of the Neo-Christendom but was also close the conservative, authoritarian, fascist-friend politics then adopted by the Pope Pius XI – who, not surprisingly, was at good terms with Mussolini so they celebrated the Treaty of Lateran, in 1929 (Kertzer 2017).

[6] For sure, that concentration had at least two main purposes: to provide the ecclesiastical hierarchy with more discipline (both organizational and doctrinaire) and to create an unified structure able to influence and make pressure upon the State.

[7] In the elections of the 2000’s and 2010’s, many candidates overtly used as mottos phrases like “vote for Jesus”, “vote for the Gospels” etc.

[8] Religious Education is the only discipline that is mentioned in the Constitution: besides the fact that specific disciplines of the scholar curriculum should not be inserted in the Constitution, other disciplines more obvious are not cited, like Portuguese and Mathematics.

[9] The article 60 of the Constitution of 1988 affirms the “articles carved in stone” (“cláusulas pétreas”), which are the elements of Brazilian polity that cannot be changed: secret, universal, direct vote; federative form; separation of powers; and individual rights and duties: it is noteworthy that laicity does not integrate such articles.

[10] So, the many states of the Brazilian federation diverge on what the students must learn in Religious Education (confessional or more historical-philosophical approaches), on what is the specific labor regime of its teachers (priests paid as civil servants or not) and even if the discipline is mandatory or not.

[11] Those without religions grew from 0% in 1940 to 8% in 2010 (Alves 2017).

[12] One example of such educational campaigns is the publication of the book The Attorney General Office in defense of the laicity of the State (CNMP 2014).